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I. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that unfair business practices originating from China
cost the United States economy anywhere between $225 billion and
$600 billion a year.1 A large portion of these losses is due to cybertheft
of U.S. trade secrets, but it does not account for the full cost of
intellectual property infringement.2 While trade secret theft is harder
to track due to lack of public disclosure, one in five companies said
China stole their intellectual property in 2019.3

1. *
THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, UPDATE TO THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP
COMMISSION REPORT) 1 (2017) [hereinafter IP COMMISSION REPORT]
2. See id. at 1, 2 (explaining that studies suggest that trade secret theft is
between 1% and 3% of GDP, which means the cost to the U.S. economy is anywhere
from $180 billion to $540 billion).
3. Erin Rosenbaum, 1 in 5 corporations say China has stolen their IP within
the last year: CNBC CFO survey, CNBC: GLOBAL CFO COUNCIL (Mar 1, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/1-in-5-companies-say-china-stoletheir-ip-within-the-last-year-cnbc.html.
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On July 7, 2020, two Chinese hackers, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi,
were indicted in a Washington district court on eleven counts, one of
which was conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets.4 For almost two
decades, China has been hacking U.S. companies and carrying out
these thefts, but U.S. companies see litigation as too costly to take any
legal action.5
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December of
2001 and, thus, agreed to abide by all WTO Agreements and treaties.6
Among these is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS).7 TRIPS was created to provide
minimum standards for intellectual property protection and
enforcement.8 Article 3 of TRIPS mandates that the intellectual
property protection a Member provides its own nationals is the
minimum protection it must provide to nationals of other WTO
Members.9 Article 39 states that trade secrets should be protected.10
Finally, Article 41 requires that enforcement procedures be available
to provide effective action against infringement.11
This Comment argues that China’s continuous cybertheft of U.S.
companies’ trade secrets, as seen in the indictment of Li Xiaoyu and
Dong Jiazhi, violates Articles 3, 39, and 41 of TRIPS.
4. Indictment ¶ 2, United States v. Xiaoyu, (No. 4:20-cr-06019-SMJ), 2020 WL
5412794 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2020).
5. Zak Doffman, ‘National Security Threat’ as Chinese Hackers are ‘Allowed’
to Target U.S. Businesses, FORBES (Apr 13, 2019, 2:33 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/04/13/u-s-businesses-allowingchinese-government-hackers-to-steal-american-secrets/#3780a9ea4d43.
6. China
and
the
WTO,
WTO – MEMBER INFORMATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm#:~:text=China%20
has%20been%20a%20member%20of%20WTO%20since%2011%20December%2
02001 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); ANTONY TAUBMAN ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE
WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT 8 (2012) (explaining that TRIPS is binding on each
Member of the WTO from the date the WTO Agreement becomes effective for that
country).
7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
8. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 17
(2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD].
9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
10. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(1).
11. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(1).
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Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the TRIPS
agreement and the history of international intellectual property
protection.12 It also provides an overview of each TRIPS article, the
WTO jurisprudence, and the details of the Li and Dong indictment. 13
Part III of this Comment analyzes China’s obligations under TRIPS
via the specific language of each TRIPS article.14 Part III further
assesses a potential counterargument to China’s obligations.15 Part IV
recommends the use of the WTO dispute settlement procedures using
violation complaints under TRIPS and enforcing the Economic and
Trade Agreement.16 Part IV also recommends a less-common option
of filing a non-violation complaint under GATT 1994.17 Part V will
conclude that China’s cybertheft of U.S. companies’ trade secrets
violated its obligations Articles 3, 39, and 41 of TRIPS.18

II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF TRIPS: PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (1883)
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883 (Paris Convention) is one of the main conventions of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is one of the first
multi-lateral agreements on the protection of intellectual property.19 It
applies to patents, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property,
in addition to protection against unfair competition.20 There are three
categories of provisions in the Convention: national treatment, right of
priority, and common rules.21 Under the provisions on national
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
14. See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
15. See discussion infra Part III.D.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last amended
on Sept 28, 1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
20. See Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1883), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
21. Id.
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treatment, the Convention provides that each Contracting State must
grant the same protection of industrial property to nationals of other
Contracting States that it grants to its own nationals,22 which is
identical to the requirement of Article 3 of TRIPS.23 Most notably, the
Paris Convention does not provide any protection for trade secrets. 24
All parts of the Paris Convention are incorporated by reference in
TRIPS.25 The right of priority and common rules only apply to the
prosecution of patents, marks, and industrial designs (design
patents).26

B. TRIPS ARTICLES AT ISSUE
The purpose of TRIPS is to reduce the barriers to international trade
while accounting for the role that intellectual property plays. 27
Because the Paris Convention fell short in certain aspects, 28 TRIPS
was created to ensure effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, including trade secrets.29
i. Article 3 – National Treatment
Article 3 of TRIPS states that each Member needs to provide
intellectual property protection to the “nationals of other Members”
22. See Paris Convention, supra note 19, arts. 2–3.
23. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
24. See Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 1(2) (outlining that protection is
only for patents, copyrights, and trademarks).
25. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 2 (stating that Members must still
fulfill their obligations under the Paris Convention).
26. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 46 (explaining that the Paris
Convention is still used to interpret TRIPS).
27. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, pmbl. (establishing the purpose of
TRIPS as a way to reduce “impediments” to international trade and ensure adequate
protection of intellectual property rights).
28. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 39, 46 (commenting that the
broadness and non-specificity of definitions in the Paris Convention rendered its
usefulness almost null).
29. The TRIPS mandate was adopted in September of 1986 during the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations, which also created the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and updated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). See
generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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that is “no less favorouable” than the intellectual property protection
it provides to its own nationals.30
“Intellectual property” is defined in Article 1.2 as all the categories
of intellectual property that are subject to Sections 1 through 7 of Part
II of the Agreement,31 which includes Article 39, which outlines
protection for undisclosed information.32 Therefore, trade secrets are
protected intellectual property rights under Article 3 of TRIPS.33
The first element of Article 3 is that protection under TRIPS is to
be provided to “nationals of other Members.”34 TRIPS does not
provide an explicit definition for “nationals” in either context
“nationals of other Members” or “own nationals.”35 The only guidance
TRIPS provides is in Article 1, where it provides that nationals of other
Members are natural or legal persons who would be eligible for
protection under previous intellectual property agreements. 36
However, none of those agreements explicitly define nationals. 37
Professor Bodenhausen, a lead commentator on the Paris Convention,
explains the application of “nationals” with respect to the Paris
Convention.38 The nationality of both natural and legal persons, such
as companies and associations, is to be determined by the authorities
where the application of the Paris Convention, and, by extension,
TRIPS, is sought.39
30. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
31. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1(2). See also TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 7, arts. 9–38 (covering the standards concerning the availability, scope, and use
of intellectual property rights).
32. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39.
33. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (providing that all categories
of intellectual property discussed by the Agreement are protected by the
Agreement).
34. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
36. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1(3) (referring to the Paris
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention, and the
Treaty of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits).
37. See Paris Convention, supra note 19, arts. 2–3.
38. G. H. C. BODENHAUSEN, UNITED INTERNATIONAL BUREAUX FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (BIRPI), GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF
THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 27 (1969).
39. See id. at 27–28 (explaining that local authorities are in the best position to
define who nationals are).
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The second element of Article 3 is the intellectual property
protection provided to other Members is “no less favourable” than the
intellectual property protection it provides to its own nationals.40 The
guiding case for interpreting the “no less favourable” language is EC
– Trademarks and Geographical Indications.41 The European
Communities (EC)42 had a regulation that contained two different sets
of procedures for the registration of geographical indications (GI) for
agricultural products and foodstuffs.43 The GI protection was not
available under the Regulation in geographical areas located in certain
countries unless the countries entered into international agreements
with the EC.44 The Panel found that the extra hurdle of obtaining these
agreements was discriminatory against non-EC members and
considered less favorable treatment.45 The Panel stressed that “[t]he
benchmark for the obligation is the treatment accorded by the
European Communities to the European Communities’ own
nationals” and that the treatment accorded by other Members to their
own respective nationals was not relevant.46
Conversely, in Indonesia – Auto Industry, the Panel did not find a
discriminatory practice despite there being different requirements for
other WTO nationals.47 Under Indonesian law, cars marketed under
the National Car Programme have to bear a trademark owned by an
Indonesian company that created the trademark.48 The Panel
40. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
41. Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 3.1, WTO
Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC – Trademarks and
Geographical Indications Panel Report].
42. See generally Will Kenton, European Community (EC), INVESTOPEDIA,
(Feb.
8,
2020)
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/europeancommunity.asp#:~:text=The%20six%20founding%20member%20countries,Maast
richt%20Treaty%20went%20into%20effect (explaining that the European
Community was the precursor to the European Union).
43. EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 41,
¶¶ 2.1, 7.38, 7.39.
44. Id. ¶ 7.139.
45. Id. ¶ 7.140.
46. Id. ¶ 7.413.
47. Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, ¶ 14.268, WTO Doc. WT/DS64/R (adopted July 2, 1998) [hereinafter
Indonesia - Auto Industry Panel Report].
48. See id. ¶¶ 2.16, 14.268.
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acknowledged that the law limited the use of trademarks owned by
foreign companies so they could not be used in one particular way.49
However, it did not find an issue regarding the acquisition of
trademark rights; limiting the types of marks that qualified under the
National Car Programme did not mean that trademark rights could not
be acquired at all.50
ii. Article 39 – Trade Secrets
Article 39 provides protection for undisclosed information,
otherwise known as trade secrets.51 Article 39.1 limits the protection
of undisclosed information to acts of “unfair competition as provided
in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967).”52 Article 39.1 further
provides that undisclosed information be protected in accordance with
39.2.53
1. Article 39.2 – Main Clause
Article 39.2 defines who is entitled to the protection, the type of
information protected, and what the information is protected against.54
Article 39.2 states that “[n]atural and legal persons shall have the
possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control
from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their
consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”55 As
discussed previously, “natural and legal persons” are defined under
national law.56 The right to prevent the disclosure, acquisition, and use
of the information only arises when the means used are “contrary to
49. See id. ¶ 14.268 (recognizing that, under the current law, the U.S. was,
effectively, unable to participate in the National Car Programme unless they
partnered with Indonesian companies).
50. See id. (explaining that the U.S. could still obtain trademarks through other
avenues).
51. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39.
52. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(1). See Paris Convention, supra note
19, art. 10bis (outlining examples for honest commercial practices).
53. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(1).
54. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2) (outlining that legal persons
are entitled to protection of their undisclosed information against dishonesty
commercial practices).
55. Id.
56. Bodenhausen, supra note 38, at 27–28.
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honest commercial practices”; determining a definition of “honest”
and “disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others” requires looking
outside of TRIPS.57
There is no WTO jurisprudence for Article 39 of TRIPS that defines
“honest” or “disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others.”58 Of the five
WTO disputes filed that cite a violation of Article 39 as a cause of
action, none have received a ruling from the WTO.59 Although Article
39.1 references Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, Article 10bis
and footnote 10 are devoid of any definition.60
The Vienna Convention sets forth that terms of an international
treaty are given their ordinary meaning in “their context and in light
of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”61 The Convention outlines that
either agreements or instruments made by parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty or subsequent agreements or practices
made by the parties may be used as interpretation tools.62 There are no
57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] (outlining treaty interpretation tools).
58. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 532.
59. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set
Forth in the Agreement, Argentina – Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test
Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, ¶ 9, WTO Doc. WT/DS171/3 (June 20,
2002) (settled); Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the
Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement, Argentina – Certain Measures on the
Protection of Patents and Test Data, ¶ 9, WTO Doc. WT/DS196/4 (June 20, 2002)
(settled); Joint Communication from China and the European Communities, China
– Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial
Information Suppliers, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS372/4 (Dec. 8, 2008) (settled);
Request for Consultations by the European Union, China – Certain Measures on the
Transfer of Technology, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1 (June 6, 2018) (in
consultations); Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European
Union, Turkey – Certain Measures Concerning the Production, Importation and
Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS583/4 (Mar. 18,
2020) (panel composed).
60. See Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 10bis (outlining examples of unfair
competition, such as confusing or misleading the customer and discrediting the
competitor); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2), n.10 (giving examples of
practices that are contrary to honest commercial practices, such as those that take
place in a contractual relationship and acquisition of undisclosed information by
third parties).
61. Vienna Convention, supra note 57, art. 31(1).
62. See id. art. 31(2–3) (outlining interpretation tools).
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such agreements between WTO members, which leads to using Article
32 of the Convention.63 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1985
(UTSA), which heavily influenced the language chosen for Article 39
of TRIPS,64 and the Economic Espionage Act65 may be consulted to
find a clear definition of “honest” and “disclosed to, acquired by, or
used by others.”66
The UTSA outlines trade secret protection in the U.S.67 It provides
disclosure, acquisition, and use by others as three methods of
misappropriation.68 In the case of disclosure and use, a third party that
is not the secret holder, such as an employee, breaches a contractual
or implied duty to maintain secrecy.69 For acquisition, the infringer has
either acquired the information from a third party, who breached their
duty to maintain the secret, or has obtained the information by
improper means.70 The UTSA delineates examples of “improper
means,” or dishonest means, which include “theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.”71
While “electronic or other means” are not explicitly defined in the

63. See id. art. 32(a) (stating that supplementary means may be used when art.
31 leaves the meaning of terms “ambiguous or obscure”).
64. See id. art. 32 (providing that supplementary means of interpretation may
include any previous treaties that were used in the creation and conclusion of the
current treaty); UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 521 (explaining that the language
in Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement is substantially based on the UTSA); THE
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 551 (Rochelle C. Dreyfus et Aa. eds., 2011) (explaining that the language
of the UTSA was integrated into the drafts the U.S. proposed for Article 39).
65. The Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
66. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2).
67. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif.
State L. 1985) (defining a trade secret) [hereinafter UTSA].
68. See id. § 1(2) (defining methods of misappropriation).
69. Id. § 1(2)(ii).
70. Id. § 1(2)(i–ii).
71. Id. § 1(1). Compare Dishonest Definition, Merriam-Webster.com
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dishonest
(last accessed Mar. 13, 2021) (defining “dishonest” as characterized by lack of truth,
honesty, or trustworthiness) with Improper Definition, Merriam-Webster.com
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dishonest
(last accessed Mar. 13, 2021) (defining “improper” as not in accord with fact, truth,
or right procedure).
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UTSA, they are well understood to encompass hacking.72
2. Article 39.2 – Trade Secret Test
Article 39.2 then sets forth a test to determine if information is
considered a trade secret.73 The first prong of the test is that the
information must not be “generally known among or readily
accessible” by people in the industry in which the information exists.74
This language is also found in the UTSA under the first prong of the
definition of a trade secret.75
The “generally known” language of the UTSA has been interpreted
by U.S. courts several times.76 In In re Maxxim, Maxxim was a medical
supply company that sold custom procedure trays (CPTs) to
hospitals.77 Maxxim claimed they had a trade secret in the design and
contents of the CPTs.78 The court held there were no trade secrets
because the design and contents were generally known.79 Tray
contents were identified in bills of materials that hospitals used
without restriction and the design of the tray was obvious to the user.80
In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., MAI created field
information bulletins (FIBs).81 The company had taken security
measures to ensure the security of their trade secrets, such as limiting
access to only management and employees with security clearance and
72. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 made it a crime to obtain a trade secret
using a computer. 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
73. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(a–c) (defining a trade secret
as information that is not generally known or readily accessible, has commercial
value from being secret, and where reasonable steps have been taken to protect its
secrecy).
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(a).
75. See UTSA § 1(4)(i) (defining a trade secret as information that is not
“generally known to” others).
76. In re Maxxim Med. Grp., Inc., et al., 434 B.R. 660, 685 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2010); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 551, 522 (9th Cir. 1993).
77. In re Maxxim Med. Grp., Inc., et al., 434 B.R. at 672.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 690 (explaining that if information is necessarily disclosed upon
use, it is generally known).
80. Id. at 691.
81. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., No. CV 92-1654-R, 1992 WL
159803, at *1, *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1992) (enumerating that FIBs include service
manuals, technical manuals, and supplements thereof).
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a security password.82 The court found that these measures were
sufficient to prove that the information was not generally known to the
public.83
The second step in the trade secret analysis set forth in Article 39.2
is that the information has “commercial value because it is secret.”84
Similar language of “independent economic value” is found under the
first prong of the definition of trade secret in the UTSA.85 An
important difference to note is that the commercial value under Article
39.2 needs to be actual commercial value, while the UTSA provides
protection for both actual and potential commercial value.86
In Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., Electro-Craft
Corp (ECC) developed and manufactured moving coil motors.87 A
handful of ECC employees left ECC, started Controlled Motion, Inc.
(CMI), and, shortly thereafter, CMI brought to market a moving coil
motor identical to that of ECC.88 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that ECC derived economic value from the motor being secret because
of the time and money expended by ECC to develop it.89 The court
reasoned that the information gave ECC a competitive advantage
because a competitor could not produce a comparable motor without
a similar investment of time and money.90
In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Chung, Cisco developed engineering
specifications for a next-generation conference room collaboration

82. Id.
83. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir.
1993); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Chung, No. 19-cv-076562-PJH, 2020 WL 4505509, at *1,
*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (holding that requiring employees to agree to a
proprietary information agreement as a condition of employment and to annually
certify that they would not use a company’s assets for non-company purposes,
monitoring an employee’s network activity, and restricting access to offices and data
systems were precautions sufficient to show that the information is not generally
known by others).
84. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(b).
85. UTSA § 1(4)(i).
86. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 529.
87. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Minn.
1983).
88. Id. at 895–96.
89. See id. at 901.
90. See id.
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device.91 Four employees left to work for a competitor, taking with
them the specifications.92 The California district court found that there
was no evidence to suggest that the specifications themselves
maintained independent economic value.93 The value of a category of
information must be expressly tethered to a particular subject matter
at issue, not just a broad category of information, such as source
code.94
The final prong of the trade secret analysis of Article 39.2 is that the
company must take reasonable steps to keep the information secret
under the circumstances in which the trade secret exists.95 This same
language is found under the second prong of the definition of a trade
secret in the UTSA.96
In Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.,
Rockwell manufactured printing presses and parts thereof.97 Piece part
drawings existed for vendors of Rockwell parts and assembly
drawings of the presses existed for customers to repair the presses. 98
DEV Industries, a direct competitor of Rockwell, was found to be in
possession of over one hundred piece part drawings.99 Rockwell kept
all its engineering drawings, including piece part and assembly
drawings, in a vault.100 Access to the vault and the building in which
the vault was stored was limited to authorized employees, most of

91. Cisco Sys. Inc., v. Chung, No. 19-cv-076562-PJH, 2020 WL 4505509, at *1,
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020).
92. Order Re Motions to Compel Arbitration, Stay the Case, and Dismiss, Cisco
Sys. Inc. v. Chung, 462 F.Supp. 3d 1024, 1031–34 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
93. See Cisco Sys., Inc., 2020 WL 4505509, at *7 (suggesting that the end
product having economic value does not give the materials used to develop and
manufacture the product independent economic value).
94. See id. at *5 (noting that if alleging significant resources are invested in
obtaining the trade secrets, the investments need to be tied to specific matters and
not just general categories of information).
95. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(c).
96. UTSA § 1(4)(ii) (“ . . . is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”).
97. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 175 (7th Cir.
1991).
98. Id. at 175–76.
99. Id. at 176.
100. Id. at 177.
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whom were engineers.101 The authorized employees were required to
sign an agreement to not disseminate the drawings or disclose their
contents but were allowed to make copies of the drawings and leave
the building with them.102 They were also required to sign the drawings
in and out from the vault.103 The court of appeals held that, while
Rockwell could have taken more steps to limit the copying of the
drawings, the steps they took to maintain the drawings’ secrecy were
reasonable under the circumstances.104 The court reasoned that the
additional steps would have come at a cost to Rockwell that most
likely would have outweighed the benefits of increased security of the
drawings.105
In contrast, in Electro-Craft, Inc., ECC took minimal precautions in
screening its handbook and did not require all employees to sign
confidentiality agreements.106While ECC’s main plant had some
guarded entrances, seven unlocked entrances did not have signage that
indicated limited access.107 Frequent informal tours were given to
vendors and customers with no warnings as to the confidential nature
of the information they would see.108 ECC did not explicitly tell
employees that the features of its motors were secret but rather treated
them as not secret as no internal or external technical documents were
marked “Confidential” and employees had unrestricted access to
them.109 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that these measures were
not reasonable to protect the secrecy of the information because there
were essentially no steps taken.110
iii. Article 41 – Enforcement
The purpose of TRIPS is to establish minimum standards, not to
harmonize the wide range of differences that exist in national laws
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 180.
105. See id.
106. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901–02
(Minn. 1983).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 903.
109. Id.
110. See id.
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with respect to enforcement rules.111 Article 41 provides the standards
that the procedures need to meet, such as being “fair and equitable”112
and that remedies must serve as a deterrent.113
Article 41.1 states that Members need to ensure that enforcement
procedures outlined in TRIPS are “available” to allow for enforcement
against “any act of infringement” of intellectual property rights
covered by TRIPS.114
Trade secrets are intellectual property rights protected under
TRIPS.115 An “infringement” of an intellectual property right occurs
when acts under the exclusive control of the title holder and not subject
to admissible exceptions, are performed by third parties without the
authorization of the title holder.116 Infringement of a trade secret is
called “misappropriation” and is discussed in Section 2 of this Part.117
Accordingly, misappropriation of trade secrets is included in “any act
of infringement” under TRIPS.118
In China - Intellectual Property Rights, China’s Copyright Law was
challenged for excluding from protection the publication or
distribution of certain works that were prohibited by other laws in
China.119 The Panel found that all works protected by the Berne
111. See Vienna Convention, supra note 57, art. 31(1) (stating that the underlying
purpose of a treaty can inform the interpretation of the treaty); UNCTAD-ICTSD,
supra note 8, at 575 (explaining that the purpose of TRIPS was to establish general
standards, not to harmonize all the current law); Panel Report, Saudi Arabia –
Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.183, WTO
Doc. WT/DS567/R (adopted Jun. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia - Intellectual
Property Rights].
112. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(2).
113. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(1).
114. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(1).
115. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (defining intellectual property
as all the categories of intellectual property that are subject to Sections 1 through 7
of Part II of the Agreement, which includes Article 39).
116. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 575–76. See Panel Report, China –
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
¶ 7.173, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China Intellectual Property Rights Panel Report] (“any act falling within scope of
[intellectual property rights] . . . without the authorization of the right holder or
outside the scope of an applicable exception is a priori an act of infringement.”).
117. See discussion supra Part II.B.
118. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(1).
119. China – Intellectual Property Rights Panel Report, supra note 116, ¶ 2.4.
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Convention (1971), which the TRIPS Agreement incorporates by
reference via Article 9.1, must be protected under China’s Copyright
Law.120 Thus, an act of infringement on any of these works is within
the meaning of “any act of infringement of intellectual property rights”
as set out in Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.121 The Panel
concluded that, in the absence of protection of intellectual property
rights, there cannot be enforcement against infringement because there
would be nothing to infringe.122

C. CHINA’S TRADE SECRET LAWS
Article 3 of TRIPS requires that the bar for trade secret protection
for nationals of other Members is that given to nationals of the
Member at issue.123 China protects trade secrets under several different
laws, but the most comprehensive is Article 10 of the Law Against
Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China (Anti-Unfair
Competition Law).124 Under Article 3 of TRIPS, this serves as the bar
for nationals of other Members.125 Under the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law, a claim for trade secret misappropriation consists of a two-step
analysis: whether there is a trade secret to protect and whether the
acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret is prohibited and thus
misappropriated.126 The article defines a trade secret and methods of
acquisition, use, or disclosures that constitute misappropriation.127
120. Id. ¶ 7.173.
121. Id.
122. Id. ¶¶ 7.168, 7.179.
123. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1) (stating that each Member
needs to provide protection to the nationals of other Members that is at least the same
as the protection it provides to its own nationals).
124. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa (中
华人民共和国反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the P.R.C.]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective
Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China). [hereinafter Anti-Unfair Competition Law]. See J.
Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 355–57 (2011) (outlining that trade secrets are
briefly covered under contract, company, labor, and labor contract law, but none are
as detailed or comprehensive as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law).
125. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1) (stating that the minimum
protection a Member needs to provide to other Members is the protection it provides
to its own nationals).
126. Bai & Da, supra note 124, at 355.
127. Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 121, art. 10 (defining a trade secret
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The Company Law of 1904 in China established several different
types of companies and created them as juristic, or legal, persons. 128
Although this Company Law was replaced and subsequently revised,
the prong of legal personhood provided to companies remained.129

D. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AT THE WTO
For a WTO complaint to be brought, there needs to be a government
measure at issue as WTO Agreements, such as TRIPS, are only
binding on the signatory Member.130 Generally, non-governmental,
private actors cannot violate the obligations of the signatory Members
in a violation complaint.131 However, if the private actions have strong
ties to governmental action, this may permit attribution of the private
action to the Member.132 In a non-violation complaint, the standard is
as “information which is not known to the public, which is capable of bringing
economic benefits to the owner of the rights, which has practical applicability and
which the owner of rights has taken measure to keep secret” and defining
misappropriation as either obtaining trade secrets from owners by “stealing,
promising gain, resorting to coercion or other improper means”, or disclosing, using,
or allowing other to use trade secrets obtained by “stealing, promising gain, resorting
to coercion or other improper means” or by “breaking an engagement or disregarding
the requirement of the owners of the rights to maintain the trade secrets in
confidence.”).
128. JiangYu Wang, Overview of the company law regime in China, in COMPANY
LAW IN CHINA: REGULATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS IN A SOCIALIST MARKET
ECONOMY 1, 3 (2014).
129. See id. at 3–7 (outlining the history of the Company Law).
130. Possible Object of a Complaint – Jurisdiction of Panels and the Appellate
Body,
WTO
DISPUTES
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c5s3p1_e.ht
m (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
131. Id.
132. See Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine
Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, ¶ 11.51, WTO Doc. WT/DS155/R
(adopted Dec. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina – Bovine Hides Panel Report]
(finding that it is possible that a government’s involvement with a private party could
be considered a governmental measure); Report of the Panel, Japan – Trade in SemiConductors, ¶ 117, L/6309 (May 4, 1988), GATT BISD (35th Supp.), at 116, 147
(1989) [hereinafter Japan – Semi-Conductors Report of the Panel] (finding that an
administrative structure implemented by the Japanese government which was
designed to exert maximum possible pressure on a private sector constituted a
governmental measure); Santiago M. Villalpando, Attribution of Conduct to the
State: How the Rule of State Responsibility may be Applied within the WTO Dispute
Settlement System, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 393, 400 (explaining that the majority of cases
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“sufficient government involvement,” which is determined on a caseby-case basis.133 There is no guidance as to specific criteria to
determine what is strong government ties or sufficient government
involvement as no complaints have been brought that have required
the WTO to create a test.134

E. THE LONG CON: THE INDICTMENT OF LI XIAOYU AND DONG
JIAZHI
On July 7, 2020, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi were indicted by a
grand jury in the U.S. with one count of conspiracy to commit theft of
trade secrets and one count of unauthorized access of a computer,
along with nine other related counts.135 From at least Sept 1, 2009,
through July 2020, the defendants gained unauthorized access to
computers of US companies and stole hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of intellectual property, including trade secrets.136 They were, at
times, hacking on behalf of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) to
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).137 They worked closely with at
least one MSS Officer on several of their hacks.138 In one specific
instance, the MSS Officer provided Li with malware to compromise
the mail server of a Burmese human rights group.139 In other instances,
Li and Dong used malicious programs, such as “web shells” and
credential-stealing software programs, on victim networks without
with attribution at issue are with measures applied by the central government of the
State and not individuals within the government or solely private individuals).
133. Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, ¶ 10.56, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Japan
– Film Panel Report] (“[P]ast GATT cases demonstrate that the fact that an action is
taken by private parties does not rule out the possibility that it may be deemed
governmental if there is sufficient governmental involvement with it. . . . [T]hat
possibility will need to be examined on a case-by-case basis.”).
134. See Villalpando, supra note 132, at 408–09 (lamenting that the Panel stopped
short with the case-by-case determination because it was not necessary in the
specific case and that there need to be criteria to determine government
involvement).
135. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
136. Id. ¶ 3.
137. See id. ¶¶ 4–5 (stating that the information stolen was of obvious interest to
the MSS).
138. See id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7 (stating that Li and Dong were aided by the MSS on at least
one occasion).
139. Id. ¶ 7.
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authorization.140
The type of data that Li and Dong stole ranged from source code
from software companies to information about drugs under
development to weapon designs and testing data from defense
contractors.141 There were at least two known U.S.-based
pharmaceutical companies where Li and Dong stole data.142 From the
Massachusetts company, Li and Dong stole the chemical structure of
anti-infective agents, the chemical engineering processes needed to
create said agents, and the test results from the company’s research.143
From the California company, Li and Dong stole the chemical
structure and design of a treatment for a common chronic disease, and
the testing, toxicity, and dosing research related to that treatment.144 In
both cases, the indictment found data stolen were trade secrets because
each victim took reasonable measures to keep the information secret,
and the information derived independent economic value from not
being generally known and readily ascertainable by another who can
obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.145
After the data were stolen, Li and Dong sent the data to China, then
sold it for profit or provided it to the MSS Officer.146

III.

ANALYSIS

China violated Articles 3, 39, and 41 of TRIPS. China violated
Article 3 because it does not provide trade secret protection to U.S.
companies, even though it does provide the protection to its own
companies under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.147 China violated
Article 39 because the information China stole from the U.S.
companies was trade secrets and hacking is not an “honest commercial
practice.”148 China violated Article 41 by facilitating the theft of U.S.
trade secrets because, by not providing U.S. companies protection for
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 15(e), 15(j), 20–73.
Id. ¶ 15(b).
Id. ¶ 16, 76.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 76.
Id. ¶ 15(n).
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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trade secrets, the enforcement procedures in place for
misappropriation of trade secrets are not available to U.S.
companies.149

A. CHINA VIOLATED ARTICLE 3 BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE
THE SAME INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION TO U.S.
COMPANIES AS IT DOES TO ITS OWN NATIONALS

China violated Article 3 because it does not provide trade secret
protection to U.S. companies.150 Article 3 requires Members to provide
intellectual property protection that is “no less favourable” to nationals
of other Members.151 Trade secrets, which are what Li and Dong stole,
are a form of protected intellectual property.152
“Nationals” are defined under local law.153 Under China’s Company
Law, companies are legal persons, and thus, “nationals,” of China.154
U.S. companies, therefore, qualify as “nationals of other Members”
for intellectual property protection in China under Article 3.155 The
minimum intellectual property protection China must provide to U.S.
companies under the TRIPS Agreement is the protection it provides to
Chinese companies.156
Under the Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law, trade secrets of

149. See discussion infra Part III.C.
150. See EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note
41, ¶ 7.413 (explaining that the minimum intellectual property protection a state
must provide is the same protection it gives its own nationals).
151. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
152. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 1(2), 39(1) (providing
that all intellectual property outlined in the TRIPS Agreement, including the
undisclosed information under Article 39, is subject to protection); discussion infra
Part III.B (proving that the information that was stolen was considered trade secrets
under Article 39).
153. See Bodenhausen, supra note 38, at 27-28 (explaining that nationality should
be determined by the authorities where the Paris Convention is being applied
because they are in the best position to make that determination).
154. Wang, supra note 128, at 3.
155. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
156. See EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note
41, ¶ 7.413 (explaining that the minimum obligation under Article 3.1 is the
treatment accorded by the European Communities to the European Communities’
own nationals).
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Chinese nationals are entitled to trade secret protection.157 When the
Chinese government158 provided the means to hack U.S. companies,159
as well as collected the stolen trade secrets, it effectively decided that
the trade secrets of U.S. companies were not entitled to the same
protection as Chinese trade secrets.160 In EC – Trademarks and
Geographical Indications, GI protection was unavailable to countries
not recognized by the EC Regulations until they entered into an
international agreement or satisfied other conditions.161 The additional
conditions and procedures were considered hurdles that discriminated
against certain countries.162 Similarly, in this case, by not providing
trade secret protection to U.S. companies, China was discriminating
against U.S. companies, and, thus, providing “less favourable”
treatment than it provided to Chinese nationals.163
China’s actions contrast those in Indonesia – Auto Industry, where
the limitation of the types of trademarks that could be used to market
cars was found to not be discriminatory because it did not limit all uses
and acquisitions of trademarks.164 As the Panel’s holding implies, a
limitation on all uses and acquisitions, which is essentially not
recognizing any trademark rights, would be discriminatory and a
157. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 124, art. 10 (defining trade
secrets and methods of infringement).
158. Compare Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 117, WTO
Doc. BISD 35S/116 (May 4, 1988) (finding that an administrative structure put in
place by the Japanese government designed to exert pressure on a private sector was
a governmental measure), with Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 4–5, 7 (stating that Li and
Dong were aided by the MSS on at least one occasion).
159. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 15, 76.
160. Compare Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 124, art.(10) (providing
that Chinese nationals are protected against disclosure and use of trade secrets that
are obtained by improper means, such as stealing), with Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 15,
76 (enumerated the methods the MS Officer aided Li and Dong in stealing
information from U.S. companies).
161. EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 41,
¶ 7.139.
162. See id. (reflecting that the hurdle was significant enough that no third country
had entered into an agreement or satisfied the conditions of the Regulation).
163. Id.; TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
164. See Indonesia – Auto Industry Panel Report, supra note 47, ¶ 14.268 (finding
that the law for acquiring trademark rights for a company of a WTO Member and
for a company operating under the National Car Programme was not different, and,
therefore, not discriminating against other WTO Members).
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violation of Article 3 “no less favourable treatment” requirement.165 In
this case, by stealing U.S. trade secrets, China has not recognized, or
has ignored, any trade secret protection to U.S. companies, regardless
of how they are being used or what they cover.166 This is synonymous
with treating the rights as if they do not exist.167 Thus, China violated
its obligations under Article 3 to provide at least equal trade secret
protection to U.S. companies as required by the TRIPS Agreement.168

B. CHINA VIOLATED ARTICLE 39 BECAUSE HACKING IS NOT AN
“HONEST COMMERCIAL PRACTICE”
Article 39.2 provides trade secret protection for “natural and legal
persons.”169 As previously discussed, the China Company Law
designates companies as legal persons.170 Thus, the U.S.
pharmaceutical companies are entitled to trade secret protection under
Article 39.171
i. China acquired the information
First, trade secret holders are protected against the information
“being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others” without their
permission.172 Of the three methods of misappropriation,173 China’s
165. See id. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1).
166. See generally Steal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) available at
Westlaw (defining “steal” as taking property illegally with the intent to keep it);
Ignore,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ignore (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (defining ignore as
refusing to take notice of); Recognize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recognize (last visited Feb. 18, 2021)
(defining recognize as to acknowledge or take notice of in some definite way).
167. Contra Recognize, supra note 166.
168. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3(1) (requiring that Members
provide protection to nationals of other Member states equal to the protection it
provides its own Members).
169. Id. art. 39(2).
170. Wang, supra note 128, at 3; see Bodenhausen supra note 38, at 27–28
(explaining that authorities where the Paris Convention is being applied are in the
best position to define what a national is under local laws).
171. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2) (stating that “natural and legal
persons” are entitled to trade secret protection).
172. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2).
173. See UTSA § 1(2)(i-ii) (providing that disclosure, use, and acquisition are
methods of misappropriation).
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method constitutes acquisition because it knew the information was
obtained by improper means.174 On several occasions, after stealing
data and information and transferring it back to China, Li and Dong
sold the information for profit or provided it directly to the Chinese
government.175 Given that the data was regarding pharmaceuticals that
were under development and not widely known at the time of the hack,
China should have known it was not acquired legally.176 On at least
one occasion, China had actual knowledge the means were improper
because a Chinese government official was involved and provided Li
and Dong with malware to facilitate their hacking.177
Second, China acquired the information from the U.S. companies
“in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”178 As per the
UTSA and EEA, theft and hacking are considered improper means of
acquiring information, and, therefore, dishonest commercial
practices.179 China committed at least fifty-three overt acts of
unauthorized access of confidential information via electronic
means.180 In one instance, China installed malicious software
programs known as “web shells” on victim networks.181 In another
instance, China uploaded credential-stealing software programs to
victim computer networks to steal passwords from authorized network
users.182 In both instances, China used an electronic means to steal the
information, which is improper proper means, and thus, not an honest

174. Compare UTSA § 1(2)(i) (defining one method of misappropriation as
“acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows . . . that the trade
secret was acquired by improper means”), with Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 15(n), 29
(listing at least two occasions where Li transferred stolen data to China).
175. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 15(n), 29.
176. Id. ¶¶ 15(b), 16.
177. Id. ¶ 7.
178. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2).
179. See UTSA § 1(1) (listing “theft” and “espionage via electronic methods” as
improper means); 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (making it a crime to obtain a trade secret using
a computer); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(n 10) (providing that an
example of “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” is acquiring a trade
secret by a party that knew dishonest commercial practices were involved in the
acquisition).
180. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 19–73.
181. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 15(e).
182. Id. ¶ 15(j).
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business practice.183
ii. The information China acquired was trade secrets
Finally, the information obtained must be trade secrets under Article
39.184 The first prong of the trade secret analysis under TRIPS is to
determine if the information is “generally known” or “readily
accessible.”185 The information China stole was not “generally known”
or “readily accessible.”186 Similar to the steps of limiting access to
information to certain employees and requiring passwords taken by
the companies in both MAI Systems Corp. and Cisco Systems, the U.S.
companies in this case limited access to information to only employees
that had certain credentials.187 The U.S. companies took several other
security measures that required Li and Dong to employ several
different methods to access the information.188 These security
measures show that the information was not generally known or
readily accessible to the public, unlike the design of the custom
procedure trays189 in In re Maxxim that was observable by the user, not

183. Id. ¶ 15(e); see UTSA § 1(1) (listing examples of improper means).
184. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(1).
185. Id. art. 39(2)(a).
186. Id. art. 39(2)(a).
187. Compare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521-22 (9th
Cir. 1993) (finding that measures such as limiting access to only management and
employees with security clearance and a security password were enough to show
that the information was not generally known or readily ascertainable) and Cisco
Sys., Inc. v. Chung, No. 19-cv-076562-PJH, 2020 WL 4505509, at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 2020) (holding that requiring employees to agree to a proprietary
information agreement as a condition of employment and to annually certify that
they would not use a company’s assets for non-company purposes, monitoring an
employee’s network activity, and restricting access to offices and data systems were
precautions sufficient to show that the information is not generally known by others),
with Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 25–30, 45, 46, 52–54, 57 (listing all the methods Li
and Dong used to gain unauthorized access to the companies’ information).
188. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 25–30, 45, 46, 52–54, 57 (listing all the methods Li
and Dong used to gain unauthorized access to the companies’ information,
suggesting that there were at least some electronic security measures in place on the
computers and networks that were accessed).
189. See
What is a custom surgical tray, CPT MEDICAL,
https://cptmed.com/what-is-a-custom-surgical-tray (defining a custom procedure
tray as medical equipment to provide disposable items used during surgery that are
specific to each procedure).
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restricted, and commonly known in the industry.190
Both pharmaceutical companies had information stolen that had
commercial value because it was secret, which satisfies the second
prong of Article 39.2.191 Similar to the investments made by the
company in Electro-Craft Corp., both pharmaceutical companies
invested a significant amount of time and money in developing their
chemical structures and designs of their treatments.192 Possession of
this information would allow a competitor to leverage the research and
be able to focus research on areas of higher potential return on
investment without the initial and significant investments of time and
money that the pharmaceutical companies had already made.193
The information the pharmaceutical companies are claiming as
trade secrets is sufficiently tied to the specific subject matter, unlike
the broad categories of information in Cisco Systems, Inc.194 In Cisco
Systems, Inc., the broad categories of information of artwork
prototypes, user experience design documentation, user interview
190. Compare Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 11 (outlining that all overt acts were carried
out without authorization and explaining that a limited number of people had access
to the information, as evidenced by most of the information being password
protected), with In re Maxxim Med. Grp., Inc., et al., 434 B.R. at 660, 685
(explaining that information that is necessarily disclosed upon use is generally
known) and AgencySolutions.com, LLC v. Trizetto Grp., 819 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1022
(E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that when information is by its nature information
normally known to other people skilled in the same field, it is generally known) and
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1253, 1256 (N.D. Ca. 1995) (explaining that the relevant group that the information
needs to be generally known to are competitors that can benefit from the information,
and clarifying that there is no requirement that there actually be active competitors
in the field, thus potential competition is sufficient).
191. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(b) (having commercial value
from being secret is a necessary step of determining whether there is a trade secret
to protect).
192. Compare Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890,
901–02 (Minn. 1983). (explaining that a prospective competitor could not produce
a comparable motor without a similar investment of time and money), with Xiaoyu,
supra note 4, ¶ 16.
193. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 16.
194. Compare Cisco Sys., 2020 WL 4505509 at *1, *5 (noting that if alleging
significant resources are invested in obtaining the trade secrets, the investments need
to be tied to specific matters and not just general categories of information), with
Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 16 (outing the specific type of information stolen from the
pharmaceutical companies).
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feedback, and source code were not expressly tied to any of the
specific subject matters at issue, specifically Cisco’s contributions to
5G technology, communications product portfolio, strategy and costs
for the pre-release video conferencing display product, and component
specification and competitive differentiators for its other unspecified
products.195 In this case, the subject matter at issue is pharmaceuticals
and the information stolen was specific chemical agents.196 For the
Massachusetts pharmaceutical company, the information stolen was
the chemical structure of anti-infective agents, the chemical
engineering processes needed to create those agents, and the test
results from the research conducted with those agents, which are all
specifically tied to the chemical agents.197 For the California
pharmaceutical company, the information stolen was the chemical
structure and design of a treatment for a common disease, along with
the testing, toxicity, and dosing research related to the treatment,
which are all specifically tied to the treatment.198 That, in combination
with the information giving the pharmaceutical companies a
competitive advantage,199 supports a finding that the information had
“commercial value because it was secret.”200
The pharmaceutical companies most likely took reasonable
precautions under the circumstances to protect their secrets, in

195. Cisco Sys., 2020 WL 4505509 at *5.
196. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 16.
197. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 16.
198. Id.
199. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901–
02 (Minn. 1983) (finding a competitive advantage in a significant investment of time
and money to obtain the information); see also AvidAir Helicopter Supply Inc. v.
Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Penalty Kick Mgmt.
Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003)) (“[E]ven if all the
information is publicly available, a unique combination of that information, which
adds value to the information, also may qualify as a trade secret”). But see
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mortensen, 606 F.3d 22, 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (denying
trade secret protection for information that had merely changed in form but not
substance).
200. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(b); see also Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1231, 1253 (N.D.Ca. 1995)
(holding that information can have commercial value if it being in the exclusive
control of the right holder has a significant financial impact on the right holder, such
as providing a majority of a company’s operating expenses).
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compliance with the third requirement of Article 39.2.201 As evidenced
from the methods that Li and Dong used to access the secrets, there
were at least some security measures in place, such as limited access
to information to only certain users.202 In Rockwell Graphic Systems,
the company took at least half a dozen steps to protect its secrets,
including keeping all its engineering drawings in a vault and limiting
access to the vault and the building in which the vault was stored to
authorized employees, which were found to be reasonable.203
Similarly, Li and Dong broke through several physical and electronic
security measures to gain unauthorized access to the data.204 In one
case, Li used an employee’s credentials without authorization to
obtain information that the employee was authorized to access.205 In
another case, Li used a web shell to print a list of user accounts that
had administrator-level privileges.206 While these security measures
show the information was not generally known or readily accessible,
they also support a finding that the pharmaceutical companies took
reasonable measures to protect their secrets.207 Even though the
measures were not enough to deter Li and Dong, they were at least
more than the measures of lax physical security, unrestricted tours, and
lack of indication of confidentiality of the motors and technical

201. See Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 23, 34 (listing some of the methods Li and Dong
used to gain access to information that only certain employees were authorized to
access); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39(2)(c) (requiring that the
information be subject to reasonable steps as part of the trade secret analysis); UTSA
§ 1(4)(ii) (requiring that the information is the subject of reasonable efforts under
the circumstances to maintain secrecy as part of the trade secret analysis).
202. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 23, 34.
203. See Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that, given the circumstances, no further steps were necessary
as the cost of additional steps may begin to outweigh the benefits they would
provide); see also E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher et al., 431 F.2d
1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding that to require an “enormous expense” to
protect a trade secret against an offense would be unreasonable).
204. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶¶ 25–30, 45, 46, 52–54, 57.
205. Id. ¶ 23.
206. Id. ¶ 34.
207. Compare Cisco Sys., 2020 WL 4505509 at *1, *5 (finding that several
security measures were sufficient to prevent information from being generally
known), with Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 177, 180 (finding that several
security measures were reasonable measures to maintain secrecy).
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documents taken by the company in Electro-Craft Corp.208 However,
similar to how the company in Rockwell Graphic Systems could have
taken additional measures, the measures taken by the pharmaceutical
companies were most likely reasonable under the circumstances.209

C. CHINA VIOLATED ARTICLE 41 BY FACILITATING THE THEFT OF
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Under Article 41.1, there must be procedures in place to allow
enforcement “against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement.”210 As per Article 1.2, trade secrets
are protected intellectual property rights under the TRIPS
Agreement.211 Li and Dong misappropriated trade secrets212 and
misappropriation of trade secrets is considered an infringement of an
intellectual property right.213 Therefore, Li and Dong infringed an
intellectual property right protected under TRIPS and China must
provide enforcement procedures for U.S. companies to pursue an
infringement action.214 While China has enforcement procedures in
place for the misappropriation of trade secrets,215 these procedures are
208. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 890, 901–
03 (Minn. 1983) (lamenting that the steps taken were minimal and that intent to
maintain secrecy not sufficient and affirmative actions are necessary).
209. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 177, 180 (holding that
reasonableness is based on the given circumstances).
210. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(1).
211. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (defining “intellectual
property” under the Agreement to refer to all categories of intellectual property in
Part II of the Agreement, which includes Article 39).
212. See discussion supra Part III.B.
213. See discussion supra Part II.B(ii).
214. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41(1) (requiring Members to make
available enforcement procedures against any act of infringement of the intellectual
property protected by the Agreement, which includes trade secrets).
215. Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 124, art. 10. See generally James
Pooley, Has China Finally Embraced Robust Trade Secret Protection?, IPWATCHDOG (June 14, 2020) https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/06/14/chinafinally-embraced-robust-trade-secret-protection/id=122471/ (discussing certain
articles of the Judicial Interpretations of China’s civil trade secret laws the Supreme
People’s Court published on June 9 in response to the U.S.-China trade agreement
signed in January 2020 and how they are more specific and closer to U.S. trade secret
law, cautioning that Judicial Interpretations are quasi-legislative enactments of the
Supreme People’s Court that can have the force of law, but that is not always the
case); Mark Cohen, SAMR Releases Draft Trade Secret Rules for Public Comment,

2021]

TRIPING ON TRADE SECRETS

957

not available to U.S. companies. By infringing U.S. companies’ trade
secret rights by stealing the trade secrets, China is effectively not
recognizing, or ignoring, their intellectual property rights as provided
by TRIPS.216
In China - Intellectual Property Rights, China excluded certain
types of works from copyright protection,217 and the Panel concluded
that there cannot be enforcement against infringement of intellectual
property rights that do not exist because there would be nothing to
infringe.218 Thus, by excluding certain works from protection, China
was making the enforcement procedures unavailable.219 Similarly,
China eliminated trade secret protection for U.S. companies by not
recognizing their trade secret rights from the onset.220 By not providing
U.S. companies protection for trade secrets, the enforcement
procedures in place for misappropriation of trade secrets are not

CHINA IPR (Sept. 12, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/09/12/samr-releases-drafttrade-secret-rules-for-public-comment, (translating the Draft Trade Secret
Protection Rules the Chinese State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR)
released on Sept. 4, 2020, discussing how the new rules are directed towards
handling administrative enforcement of trade secrets by SAMR and how the new
rules specifically extend trade secret protection to foreign nationals, which had been
a point of contention in the earlier rules where the definition of a ‘right holder’ was
discriminatory).
216. See generally Infringement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
available at Westlaw (defining “infringement” in regards to intellectual property to
mean interfering with the exclusive rights of an intellectual property right holder);
Ignore, supra note 166 (defining “ignore” as refusing to take notice of); Recognize,
supra note 166 (defining “recognize” as to acknowledge or take notice of in some
definite way).
217. China - Intellectual Property Rights Panel Report, ¶ 2.4, WTO Doc.
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
218. See id. ¶ 7.178 (refuting China’s argument that right holders still have access,
explaining that not preventing right holders from filing and pursuing claims in vain
is not sufficient).
219. See id. ¶ 7.179 (explaining that articles under the enforcement umbrella of
TRIPS specify that judicial authorities shall have the ability to take certain actions
but, when copyright protection is denied under Chinese Copyright Law, the judicial
authorities lose their authority under Chinese law, and the enforcement procedures
under TRIPS become unavailable because there is no judicial authority to carry them
out).
220. See generally Steal Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 166;
Infringement Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 216; Ignore Definition,
Merriam-Webster, supra note 166.
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available to them under Article 41.1.221 Therefore, China violated its
obligation to make available to U.S. companies enforcement
procedures for the misappropriation of trade secrets.222

D. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
China violated Article 3’s “no less favourable treatment”
requirement because it does not provide the same intellectual property
protection to U.S. companies as it does to its own nationals.223 China
did not recognize any trade secret protection for U.S. companies,
which is discriminatory.224
China violated Article 39 because hacking is not an “honest
commercial practice.”225 The information stolen from the
pharmaceutical companies by Lin and Dong was not “generally
known,”226 had “commercial value from being secret,”227 and was
“subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances.”228 Thus, the
221. See China - Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R, ¶ 7.179.
222. See TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 41(1) (requiring Members to make available
enforcement procedures against any act of infringement of the intellectual property
protected by the Agreement, which includes trade secrets).
223. TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3(1). See EC – Trademarks and Geographical
Indications Panel Report, supra note 41, ¶ 7.413 (explaining that the minimum
intellectual property protection a state must provide is the same protection it gives
its own nationals).
224. See EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note
41, ¶ 7.139 (finding that any difference in requirements based on country of origin
was discriminatory).
225. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 39(2); UTSA § 1(1) (defining “improper means”
of acquiring a trade secret to include “espionage via electronic means”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (making it a crime to use a computer to obtain a trade secret). See generally
Steal Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 166; Infringement Definition,
Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 216.
226. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 39(2)(a). See Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Chung, No. 19cv-076562-PJH, 2020 WL 4505509, at *1, *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (finding that
several security measures were sufficient to prevent information from being
generally known).
227. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 39(2)(b). See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled
Motion, Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983) (explaining that a significant
investment of time and money gave a company a competitive advantage if a
competitor would also need to invest a significant amount of time and money to
obtain the same result).
228. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 39(2)(c). See Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV
Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 177, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that several security
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companies had protectable trade secrets under Article 39 of TRIPS,
and, by misappropriating the trade secrets, China violated Article 39
of TRIPS.229
China violated Article 41 by removing trade secret protection for
U.S. companies.230 By not providing U.S. companies protection for
trade secrets, the enforcement procedures in place for
misappropriation of trade secrets are not available to them under
Article 41.1.231 Therefore, China violated its obligation to U.S.
companies to make enforcement procedures available for the
misappropriation of trade secrets.232

E. COUNTER ARGUMENT – THE FLEXIBILITIES IN ARTICLE 1 DO
NOT ABSOLVE CHINA OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER TRIPS
Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides two important points
of flexibility to Members in implementing TRIPS.233 The second
sentence of Article 1.1 contains the first point that Members can
choose to implement “more extensive protection” than what is
outlined in the Agreement if so desired, but that is not required.234 This
measure allows a degree of flexibility in how a member integrates the
requirements of TRIPS, which is consistent with how other Articles
are drafted.235 However, as Article 1.1 explicitly makes clear with
measures were reasonable measures to maintain secrecy under the given
circumstances).
229. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 39(2)(a-c).
230. See generally Steal Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 166;
Infringement Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 157.
231. See Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 116, ¶ 2.4 (finding that
removing copyright protection for certain types of works inherently made the
infringement enforcement procedures unavailable because there was no right to
infringe).
232. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 41(1) (requiring Members to
make available enforcement procedures against any act of infringement of the
intellectual property protected by the Agreement, which includes trade secrets).
233. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1(1) (providing that Members
may implement more extensive measures than those provided in the Agreement and
are free to determine the methods of implementation).
234. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1(1); see UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra
note 8, at 17, 24 (explaining that TRIPS only sets minimum standards).
235. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 24 (noting that several requirements
outlined in TRIPS are framed in flexible terms).
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phrasing it as “more extensive,” the provisions provided in the
Agreement are the floor for required protections of intellectual
property, not the ceiling.236 Members, including China, are still
obligated to provide the minimum protections outlined in the
agreement.237
The second point of flexibility under Article 1.1 is the third sentence
that provides that Members are “free to determine” methods of
implementing the provisions of the agreement within their own legal
systems.238 This point of flexibility is important because it recognizes
that intellectual property law is inherently not rigid.239 It allows
Members to determine how best to meet their obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement while working within their established legal
systems.240 This discretion does not, however, extend to choosing with
which obligations to comply.241 Members, including China, are still
required to implement all provisions of TRIPS.242

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. THE U.S. SHOULD FILE DISPUTES USING THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS

The WTO dispute settlement system is in place for Member States
to initiate enforcement proceedings for agreements for which the
236. See EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note
41, ¶ 7.413 (explaining that protection provided to other countries is at least that
provided to nationals of the country providing the protection).
237. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1(1) (requiring that Members
abide by the provisions of the Agreement).
238. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1(1).
239. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 18 (explaining that because
intellectual property law is inherently flexible, the express text of TRIPS needed to
reflect that).
240. See Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 59, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec 19,
1997) [hereinafter India - Patents] (interpreting art. 1.1).
241. See Panel Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection, ¶ 6.94, WTO Doc.
WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000) [hereinafter Canada – Patents] (explaining that
Members cannot ignore a set of requirements while attempting to implement others).
242. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 8, at 24 (explaining Article 1.1 authorizes
Members to implement the rules in a manner most appropriate for itself, as long as
the implementation is in line with the rest of the requirements of TRIPS).
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WTO is governing body, such as disputes, which arise when one WTO
member takes actions that one (or more) other WTO members
consider to in violation of their obligations under a WTO agreement.243
The procedures are relatively fast, efficient, and effective; most
disputes are settled in about a year.244 The ultimate goal in the dispute
process is for the violating country to comply with the ruling of the
Panel.245 The first stage is to enter into consultations where the parties
try to settle their differences.246 If consultations fail, the case is taken
to the panel and the panel makes a ruling; if the violating country does
not comply with the ruling within a reasonable time, the next step is
that the violating country provides compensation, such as in the form
of reduced tariffs.247
The U.S. won or favorably settled seventy-five out of the seventynine WTO cases it has brought.248 Even so, it is unlikely China will
comply within a reasonable time considering that the hacking has been
happening for almost two decades, sometimes even under the
supervision of the government.249
The most effective way for the U.S. to push China to comply is to
file as many disputes as possible at one time.250 This will send China
243. Understanding The WTO: Settling Dispute, World Trade Organization,
WTO-DISPUTES,
at
1–2,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct.
25, 2020).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id. at 2.
247. Id. at 2–3.
248. Fixing the Foundation: The Policymaking Process, U.S. CHAMBER COM., at
1, https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/enforce-trade-agreements.
249. See Laura Sullivan & Cat Schuknecht, As China Hacked, U.S. Businesses
Turned A Blind Eye, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/12/711779130/as-china-hacked-u-s-businessesturned-a-blind-eye (explaining the history of China’s hacking).
250. See James Bacchus, How the World Trade Organization Can Curb China’s
Intellectual Property Transgressions, CATO INSTITUTE, at 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/blog/how-world-trade-organization-can-curb-chinasintellectual-property-transgressions (explaining that using the WTO dispute
settlement system is the most effective way to hold China accountable because, in
the past, when China was been found to be violating its WTO obligations, it has
complied with WTO rulings and that staying in the WTO is important as to not
undermine the WTO, which, in turn, would undermine U.S. intellectual property
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a message that the U.S. will not tolerate violations of a trade agreement
that both parties are obligated to comply with.251 The one caveat is that
in order to bring disputes, the U.S. needs willing plaintiffs.252 This has
proven to be a challenge in the past.253 Despite the tens of thousands
of companies that have been victims of China’s cybertheft over the
past two decades, very few want to come forward for fear of
“jeopardizing [the] billions of dollars of trade” and business they do
with China, in addition to having to answer to shareholders.254
The U.S. government has known about the severity of the problem
for many years but has not focused efforts on it.255 To encourage
companies to come forward, the U.S. needs to make the extent of the
threat and damage public and make known that the full force of the
U.S. government is ready to support the companies should they choose
to come forward.256 The U.S. government needs to stress in public
rights and for China to be judged by impartial and objective WTO jurists).
251. See id. at 2 (expressing that fusing the WTO dispute settlement system in
this way would be a true test of the U.S.’s and China’s commitment to the WTO);
see also Argentina – Bovine Hides Panel Report, supra note 132, ¶ 11.51 (finding
that it is possible that a government’s involvement with a private party could be
considered the governmental measure required to bring a violation complaint).
252. See Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system, WTO–DISPUTES,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s4p1_e.ht
m#:~:text=The%20only%20participants%20in%20the,parties%20or%20as%20thir
d%20parties (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (explaining that only WTO Member
governments can bring disputes, not individual plaintiffs).
253. See Sullivan & Schuknecht, supra note 249 (illustrating that companies are
hesitant to bring forward cases of trade secret theft for various reasons).
254. See id. at 3–4, 8 (chronicling an instance when a secretive group of the
Chinese military broke into computer systems of American companies, stealing all
information they accessed and, when presented with the option to pursue legal
recourse, the company declined because of the potential financial fallout); Doffman,
supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the public announcement made by Google in 2010 that
they, along with at least twenty other companies, had been victims of a cyber-attack
by China, yet Google was the only company that came forward); Kate M. Growley
et al., Is Chinese IP Theft Coming to an End?, CROWELL MORNING (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.crowelltradesecretstrends.com/2020/02/is-chinese-ip-theft-coming-toan-end/ (explaining that U.S. companies want access to the immense Chinese
market).
255. See Sullivan & Schuknecht, supra note 249 (lamenting that the Department
of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the
U.S. State Department all knew how serious the issue was and the universal answer
from each was “Bad problem, but not my problem”).
256. See id. at 8 (explaining that a large part of the reason companies are not
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statements with data showing that the potential financial consequences
the companies will face are well worth it to halt and prevent China’s
nefarious behavior and protect the future innovations of U.S.
companies.257

B. THE U.S. SHOULD ENFORCE THE US-CHINA TRADE AGREEMENT
SIGNED IN JANUARY 2020
On January 15, 2020, the U.S. and China entered into Phase One of
the Economic and Trade Agreement, a free-trade agreement.258 The
very first chapter of the agreement is on Intellectual Property and
Article 1.2 covers trade secrets and confidential business
information.259 This section is what is sometimes referred to as a
TRIPS-Plus Agreement.260 Under Article 1.4 of the agreement, China
agreed that “electronic intrusions” were one way to misappropriate
trade secrets and, under Article 1.8, agreed to provide for criminal
procedures for misappropriation.261
One way for the U.S. to enforce the trade agreement is under
coming forward is that the companies do not want to jeopardize the billions of dollars
of trade they do with China); IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16
(explaining that companies are reluctant to come forward out of fear of harming
investment opportunities of diminishing market valuation).
257. See IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (estimating that hacking,
specifically, costs the U.S. economy at least $400 billion, which includes the full
cost of infringement and misappropriation); Attorney General William Barr,
Address at the Dept. of Justice’s China Initiative Conf. (Feb. 6, 2020), (laying forth
an aggressive plan to address China’s theft of U.S. intellectual property, warning
how short-term complacency from the private sector with China’s actions could have
costly long-term effects); Information About the Department of Justice’s China
Initiative and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DOJ PUB.
AFF. OFF., https://www.justice.gov/opa/information-about-department-justice-schina-initiative-and-compilation-china-related (last updated Oct. 20, 2020)
(enumerating specific measures the DOJ is taking to combat China’s intellectual
property theft).
258. Matthew P. Goodman, et al., What’s Inside the U.S.-China Phase One Deal?,
CSIS, at 1 (2020).
259. Economic and Trade Agreement, U.S.-China, art. 1.2, (Jan. 15, 2020)
[hereinafter Economic and Trade Agreement].
260. Dalindyebo Bafana Shabalala, Access to Trade Secret Environmental
Information: Are TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Obligations a Hidden Landmine?, 55
COLUMN. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 648, 706 (2017).
261. Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 259, arts. 1.4, 1.8.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.262 Under Section 301, the U.S.
has the authority to impose trade sanctions on foreign countries that
either violate trade agreements or engage in other unfair trade
practices.263 The U.S. has done this in the past for China on essentially
the same issue of technology transfer and theft of intellectual
property.264 The Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) decided in that case that tariffs against China were appropriate
to recover the $50 billion in damages.265 In this case, the damages are
significantly more,266 over a longer period of time,267 and the methods
by which the information was obtained are very similar,268 so there is
a high probability the USTR will find that tariffs are an appropriate
measure again.

C. THE U.S. SHOULD FILE A NON-VIOLATION COMPLAINT
THROUGH THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM UNDER GATT
1994
A non-violation complaint is used to challenge any measure applied
by another WTO Member that results in nullification or impairment of
a benefit given to the affected Member via an agreement that both
Members are party to.269 The benefit can be nullified or impaired as
262. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2462.
263. Section
301,
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
ADMINISTRATION,
https://legacy.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/tg_ian_002100.asp
(July 25, 2018).
264. USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China, U.S.
TRADE Representative, (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/ [https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiationsection].
265. Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning
Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,
83 Fed. Reg. 14906, 14907 (Apr. 6, 2018).
266. IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
267. Xiaoyu, supra note 4, ¶ 3.
268. See Section 301 Investigation Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/factsheets/2018/june/section-301-investigation-fact-sheet (last accessed Oct. 25, 2020)
(outlining that cyber intrusions of U.S. commercial computer networks to gain
unauthorized access to commercially-valuable business information were among the
unfair practices China implemented).
269. GATT 1994, supra note 29, art. XXIII(1).
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the result of the failure of another Member to carry out its obligations
under specific WTO agreements, the application by another Member
of any measure, or the existence of any other situation.270 There is no
requirement that an agreement be violated to file a complaint.271
Although Article 64.1 of TRIPS incorporated the non-violation
complaint practice of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 as a dispute
settlement option,272 there has been a moratorium on non-violation
complaints based on TRIPS since 1998.273
However, a non-violation complaint may still be possible under
GATT 1994.274 While GATT 1994 only dealt with the trade of goods
and services, Article XXIII does not restrict non-violation complaints
to only be tied to specific tariff concessions or market access
commitments by another Member made under GATT; expectation of
market access could be indirectly associated with a good or service not
covered by a specific concession or tariff.275 There are three elements
of a non-violation claim: (1) identification of a ‘measure’; (2)
identification of a ‘benefit’ under an agreement; and (3) proof that the
measure nullifies or impairs the benefit.276 The very few non-violation
cases that have been brought have hinged on whether the moving party
reasonably expected to receive the benefit.277 The “measure” in this
case would be China’s cybertheft.278 The benefit would be one of the
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 64(1).
273. WTO Members Agree to Extend E-Commerce, Non-Violation Moratoriums,
WTO
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gc_10dec19_e.htm (explaining that
the moratorium has been extended several times, with the last extension being in
December of 2019 until the Ministerial Conference that was to be held in June of
2020).
274. Nirmalya Syam, Non-Violation and Situation Complaints under the TRIPS
Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries 1, 22 (South Centre, Research
Paper, 2020).
275. Id. at 22.
276. Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, Non-Violations, 16 J. INT’L. ECON. L.
741, 753 (2013); see GATT 1994, supra note 29, art. XXIII(1) (providing that
measure needs to be taken by a contracting party, which is a government).
277. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 276, at 752.
278. See GATT 1994, supra note 29, art. XXIII(1) (providing that the benefit of
the Agreement can be impeded by “the application by another contracting party of
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement,. . . .”)
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general purposes of GATT, which was to eliminate discriminatory
treatment in international commerce and expand the production and
exchange of goods.279 China is discriminating against the U.S. by
stealing U.S. trade secrets.280 The proof that the cybertheft is impairing
the benefit is the damage the theft has done to the U.S. economy and
the U.S. companies involved.281 The U.S. could not have reasonably
expected China to impede on the production and exchange of goods
by stealing U.S. trade secrets.
This is not a perfect recommendation. There have been very few
non-violation complaints brought to the WTO and even fewer
successful ones; only three cases have panel decisions that adjudicated
the non-violation claim on the merits, and none of the claims
succeeded.282 The only successful non-violation claims were before
the creation of the WTO in the GATT years.283 The successful claims
all involved commercial measures such as subsidies and tariffs, 284
which are not present in this case. However, in principle, non-violation
complaints can be brought about any type of measure, and even “other
situations.”285 In addition, there is no requirement of evidence of
improper behavior, only that a benefit was impeded.286 The result of a
non-violation complaint is that the parties make a mutually
satisfactory adjustment, which is not as severe or permanent a solution
as a violation claim, but it would at least compensate U.S.
companies.287
(emphasis added); Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, ¶ 10.56, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998)
(commenting that an action taken by private parties may be deemed governmental if
there is sufficient governmental involvement).
279. GATT 1994, supra note 29, pmbl.
280. The assumption being made is that China is not stealing other countries’
trade secrets. It is most likely a safe assumption that China is stealing other
countries’ trade secrets, as well, but not every country, which still makes the measure
discriminatory.
281. IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
282. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 276, at 748.
283. Id. at 745.
284. Id. at 753–54.
285. Id.; GATT 1994, supra note 29, art. XXIII(1).
286. Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.99,
WTO Doc WT/DS163 (June 19, 2000).
287. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 276, at 748.
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V. CONCLUSION
China’s cybertheft of U.S. companies’ trade secrets is a violation of
the TRIPS Agreement. The cybertheft violated Article 3 as it does not
provide U.S. companies with the same trade secret protection as
Chinese companies. Article 39 was violated because the theft was of
trade secrets. By not providing trade secret protection to U.S.
companies, there are, by definition, no enforcement procedures
available under Article 41 of the Agreement. The U.S. needs to hold
China accountable and can do so through the WTO dispute settlement
procedures with violation complaints filed under TRIPS, nonviolation complaints filed under GATT 1994, and enforcing the
Economic and Trade Agreement U.S. and China signed in January
2020.

